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FOREWORD
In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, U.S. Secretary
of Defense James Mattis stated that his department
“will prioritize investments in resilience, reconstitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities.”1
In March 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump upheld
these defense priorities in his National Space Strategy
that focuses on the protection of “our vital interest in
space—to ensure unfettered access to, and freedom to
operate in space, in order to advance America’s security, economic prosperity, and scientific knowledge.”2
Four months later, President Trump directed the
Department of Defense (DoD) to lay the foundation
for a military Space Force on par with the existing Air
Force. While this directive still must clear Congress,
one thing is certain—military space operations remain
an essential part of joint operations.
In this monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton explores
challenges to these space-related U.S. security priorities posed by the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
efforts of potential adversaries. He argues that Russia
and China pose the most viable A2/AD threat to U.S.
space assets and contends that these nations see space
activities as an integral part of their military operations
and national prestige. To address possible mitigation
of A2/AD efforts in the space domain, Mr. Caton provides recommendations in the areas of realistic expectations for space support, cyberspace considerations in
space systems, natural space hazards, and the potential
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of unintentional escalation. This monograph should
inform the ongoing activities of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as well as individual service
space organizations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
ENDNOTES - FOREWORD
1. Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Defense, p. 6, available from https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
2. “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump is Unveiling
an America First National Space Strategy,” Washington, DC:
The White House, March 23, 2018, available from https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpunveiling-america-first-national-space-strategy/.
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SUMMARY
In January 2012, former President Barack Obama
and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta published new
strategic guidance for 21st century defense. Third
among the document’s 10 primary missions of U.S.
Armed Forces is the call to “project power despite
anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] challenges,” which
included the charge to continue “efforts to enhance
the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based
capabilities.”1 Further, the fifth mission is to “operate effectively in cyberspace and space” potentially
against “a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt,
or destroy assets.”2 The 2018 National Defense Strategy
and National Space Strategy both reaffirm the vital interests that the United States has in the domain of space.
The utilization of space-based capabilities is an
established part of modern military operations. The
first live test of a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) system
in 2007 forever changed how the world operates in
space. In one event, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) created over 2,000 pieces of debris that increased
the number of manmade objects in space by 20 percent, which increased the likelihood of collisions by 37
percent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained ASAT capabilities that included direct ascent,
co-orbital, and directed energy systems; many of these
could be reconstituted by Russia. The technologies
required for A2/AD of space satellites were proven
and some were even operationalized decades ago and
it is reasonable to consider that future rivals may utilize
such systems. In short, space operations are becoming
inherently more hazardous and vulnerable to disruption, denial, or destruction.
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This monograph explores what might happen if an
adversary applied such measures to U.S. space systems
and how this might affect Army and joint operations.
To accomplish this goal, this research focuses on the
central question: What are ways for the Army to assure
the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an A2/AD environment where space systems
are degraded for significant periods of time? After
providing some necessary background information on
space systems, this monograph addresses this question in three parts. First, it analyzes the space capabilities of potential adversaries as well as the technologies
required and the nations that possess such capabilities. Second, it explores the strategic implications of
such attacks and their potential effects on elements
of national power, and then it concentrates on operational effects if space systems were degraded or made
unavailable to the Army and other joint warfighters.
Third, it examines current measures that may mitigate
the negative effects of adversary A2/AD activities as
well as possible alternative space capabilities under
development. Finally, it makes recommendations for
U.S. defense leadership with regard to strategic and
operational opportunities to enhance A2/AD mitigation activities and the effectiveness of U.S. space power
writ large.
The vision of outer space as a vast and tranquil sea
is but an illusion; space is an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and
competitive among the nations—and this trend shows
no sign of abatement. However, as with the land, sea,
and air commons, the peaceful pursuit of economic,
diplomatic, and informational ends in space often
requires the support of a capable and restrained military space force. The continued preeminence of U.S.

xii

military space capabilities depends on deliberate
efforts to ensure access to and freedom of movement
within the space domain.
ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Department of Defense (DoD), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Defense, January 2012, pp. 4-5, available from
http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf,
accessed August 11, 2017.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
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IMPACTS OF ANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL
MEASURES ON SPACE SYSTEMS: ISSUES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND JOINT FORCES
In January 2012, former President Barack Obama
and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta published new
strategic guidance for 21st century defense. Third
among the document’s 10 primary missions of U.S.
Armed Forces is the call to “project power despite
anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] challenges,” which
included the charge to continue “efforts to enhance
the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based
capabilities.”1 Further, the fifth mission is to “operate effectively in cyberspace and space” potentially
against “a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt,
or destroy assets.”2
The first live test of a Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT)
system in 2007 forever changed how the world operates
in space. In one event, the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) created over 2,000 pieces of debris that
increased the number of manmade objects in space by
20 percent, which increased the likelihood of collisions
by 37 percent. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union
maintained ASAT capabilities that included direct
ascent, co-orbital, and directed energy systems; many
of these could be reconstituted by Russia. The technologies required for A2/AD of space satellites were
proven and some were even operationalized decades
ago and it is reasonable to consider that future rivals
may utilize such systems. In short, space operations
are becoming inherently more hazardous and vulnerable to disruption, denial, or destruction.
This monograph explores what might happen if an
adversary applied such measures to U.S. space systems
and how this might affect Army and joint operations.
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To accomplish this goal, this research focuses on the
central question: What are ways for the Army to assure
the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an A2/AD environment where space systems
are degraded for significant periods of time? After
providing some necessary background information on
space systems, the monograph addresses this question
in three parts. First, it analyzes the space capabilities
of potential adversaries as well as the technologies
required and the nations that possess such capabilities. Second, it explores the strategic implications of
such attacks and their potential effects on elements
of national power, and then it concentrates on operational effects if space systems were degraded or made
unavailable to the Army and other joint warfighters.
Third, it examines current measures that may mitigate
the negative effects of adversary A2/AD activities as
well as possible alternative space capabilities under
development. Finally, it will make recommendations
for U.S. defense leadership with regard to strategic and
operational opportunities to enhance A2/AD mitigation activities and the effectiveness of U.S. space power
writ large.
BACKGROUND
Space forces support the semi-independent execution
of cross-domain maneuver and integrated security
operations through space-based intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance [ISR]; satellite communications
[SATCOM]; PNT [position, navigation, and timing];
environmental monitoring; and missile warning. Space
operations enable movement and maneuver within the
operational environment via joint friendly force tracking,
navigation warfare, alternate compensatory control
measures, and special technical operations. Space forces
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protect the use of space-based capabilities and space
domain freedom of maneuver through offensive and
defensive space control.3

The utilization of space-based capabilities is an
established part of modern military operations. Before
examining specific space-related A2/AD threats and
responses, it is necessary to provide a brief background
on what comprises a space system as well as how space
systems are employed in joint operations.
Three Segments of Space Systems
Space systems are comprised of three segments:
ground, space, and link. Ground segments include
space launch centers; telemetry, tracking, and command facilities; radar sites; and user application
devices, such as a global positioning system (GPS)
navigation aid. Space segments are items in Earth orbit
such as satellites, space stations, and reusable launch
vehicles. Link segments are the intentional electromagnetic emissions between space and ground segments
to transmit data or energy.4
The current joint definition of A2/AD can be simplified as adversary efforts to deny long-range access
to, or freedom of movement within, a given area of
operations.5 Adversary A2/AD efforts against space
systems can target any one of the three segments to
be effective. Ground segments can be attacked by
ground troops or precision fires, but the ground segments that support the space segment will likely be
located outside the operational area. The link segment
can be attacked by jamming the command signals to
the space segment (uplink jamming) or by jamming
the data transmission from the space segment to a
user device (downlink jamming). In very sophisticated
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attacks, the uplink may be captured, modified, and
retransmitted to “spoof” the space segment into performing unintended functions. The space segment
can be attacked using means that do not cause permanent damage, such as the dazzling of optical sensors
by low-power lasers. They can also be attacked with
methods designed to disable or destroy the space segment, such as kinetic energy or explosive ASAT missiles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic pulse
devices, or even cyberspace malware inserted into the
uplink.6 Given the importance of space capabilities for
joint operations, it is prudent for U.S. military planners
to anticipate that future adversaries will attack space
systems.7
Space Mission Areas
Joint and Army doctrine organize space into five
mission areas that this monograph uses as a framework for the analysis of space-related A2/AD threats
and mitigation measures. They are defined as:
space situational awareness. Cognizance of the
requisite current and predictive knowledge of the space
environment and the operational environment upon
which space operations depend [emphasis in original].
space force enhancement. Combat support operations
and force-multiplying capabilities delivered from space
systems to improve the effectiveness of military forces as
well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial
users [emphasis in original].
space control. Operations to ensure freedom of action
in space for the United States and its allies and, when
directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space
[emphasis in original].
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space support. Launching and deploying space
vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit,
rendezvous and proximity operations, disposing of
(including deorbiting and recovering) space capabilities,
and reconstitution of space forces, if required [emphasis
in original].
space force application. Combat operations in, through,
and from space to influence the course and outcome of
conflict by holding terrestrial targets at risk [emphasis in
original].8

Each of these mission areas are divided into functional
capabilities that can be correlated to Army warfighting
functions, as depicted in this monograph’s appendix.
Further details of U.S. space doctrine are available to
the reader in existing publications and will not be repeated here.9 Having established a common lexicon for
discussion, let us examine potential A2/AD threats to
U.S. space operations.
SPACE A2/AD THREATS
The 2011 National Security Space Strategy posits, “The
current and future strategic environment is driven
by three trends—space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive [italics in original].”10 If
competition leads to conflict, what countries currently
possess or are working to develop specific space capabilities that could be used to achieve A2/AD against
the United States?
Potential Adversaries in Space
In his April 2017 Congressional as Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), General
John Hyten named four countries of particular concern
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to his command: Russia, China, North Korea, and
Iran.11 However, do these countries have viable space
A2/AD capabilities that could significantly affect U.S.
military operations? To answer this question, we need
to examine each country’s progress in major milestones
related to military space power, their current presence
in space, and their current capability to perform the
five joint space missions.
Table 1 provides a historical timeframe for each of
these countries of key space-related milestones that
indicate progression in the development of advanced
space capabilities. Driven by Cold War motivations,
the United States and Russia followed the same evolutionary path of space-related technology and system
development: atomic weapons, large rockets capable
of orbiting satellites, missiles with intercontinental
range coupled with payloads that can survive reentry
to Earth, rockets and life support systems that enable
human spaceflight, and ASAT systems with intercept
and kinetic kill capabilities. China traveled a similar
path over a decade later and they have made great
strides in their space power during the 21st century.
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Country
United
States

Union of Soviet
Socialist
Republics/Russia

China

North
Korea

Iran

Atomic Bomb
Test

1945

1949

1964

2006

▬

Satellite
Launch

1958

1957

1970

2012

2005

Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile

1959

1957

1971

2017

▬

Manned
Orbital Flight

1962

1961

2003

▬

▬

Anti-Satellite
Test

1960s

1960s

2007

▬

▬

Milestone

Table 1. Significant Space-Related Milestones
Iran successfully launched its first satellite on October 27, 2005. Although it has plans to develop military
reconnaissance and communications satellites, Iran
currently has only one satellite in orbit. Much of the
success of their missile development is credited to Russian technical assistance, which has steadily increased
since Vladimir Putin became President.12 Some analysts
contend that Iran is “developing boosters for what it
claims are space purposes that create the potential to
deploy a future ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile].”13 Regardless, Iran is still a fledging space power
at best.
North Korea launched its first satellite on December 12, 2012, and its current active orbital inventory is
a single satellite. Analysts from India’s National Institute of Advanced Studies who reconstructed the 2012
satellite launch concluded that “North Korea is somewhat more advanced than either Iran or Pakistan in
space and missile technologies and products [emphasis in original]” and that “the actual performance of
7

the Unha launcher as a missile, must be a source of
considerable concern to North Korea’s immediate
neighbours as well as the United States [emphasis in original].”14 The North Korean missile force is
estimated to have approximately 200 Nodong medium-range ballistic missiles and 100 Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles.15 North Korea has
regularly pushed the limits of international patience
with its defiant missile tests in the Pacific Ocean. In
July 2017, they achieved the first two successful test
flights of an ICBM.16 Even with such advances in their
force application capability, North Korea, like Iran, is a
very immature space power.
Table 2 depicts the current space object inventories
for countries based on the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration’s (NASA) orbital “box score” for
August 2017. The United States has the preponderance
of active payloads in space, which number over twice
that of Russia and China combined. However, not all
space mission areas require assets in space; for example, many space situational awareness systems are
ground-based radars.
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Country/
Organization

National Aeronautics
and Space
Administration

CelesTrak

Union of
Concerned
Scientists

Total
Payloads

Total
Objects

Total
Payloads

Active
Payloads

Active
Payloads

United States

1,529

6,218

1,508

722

593

Commonwealth
of Independent
States (Russia)

1,509

6,506

1,500

147

135

China

250

3,844

249

205

192

Japan

162

258

165

84

*

India

82

197

83

54

*

European Space
Agency

75

133

75

44

*

France

63

545

62

23

*

North Korea

*

*

2

1

*

Iran

*

*

1

1

*

Other

825

939

952

597

539

Totals

4,495

18,640

4,597

1,878

1,459

* value not available or discernible from source information

Table 2. Space Objects Count for Selected
Countries17
Table 3 provides a qualitative assessment of the
space force capabilities of Russia, China, Iran, and
North Korea organized by the five joint space mission
areas. From this, it is reasonable to classify the overall
Russian and Chinese military space capability as near
peers to that of the United States.
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Joint Space Operations
Mission Areas

Potential Adversaries
Russia

China

Iran

North Korea

Detect, Track, and Identify

OP ▲

OP ▲

▬

▬

Threat Warning and Assessment

Space Situational Awareness

OP ▲

OP ▲

▬

▬

Characterization

OP

OP ▲

▬

▬

Data Integration and Exploitation

OP

OP ▲

▬

▬

Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR)

OP

OP ▲

▬

▬

Launch Detection

OP

OP ▲

▬

▬

Space Force Enhancement

Missile Tracking

OP

OP ▲

▬

▬

Environmental Monitoring

OP

OP

▬

▬

Satellite Communications
(SATCOM)

OP

OP

▬

▬

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
(PNT)

OP

▲

▬

▬

Navigation Warfare

OP

OP

▬

▬

OP ▲

OP ▲

DEMO

DEMO

Satellite Operations

OP

OP

DEMO

DEMO

Reconstitution of Space Forces

OP

OP

▬

▬

Space Supports
Spacelift

Space Control
Offensive Space Control

OP ▲

DEMO ▲

▬

▬

Defensive Space Control

OP

DEMO ▲

▬

▬

OP

DEMO ▲

▬

▬

OP ▲

OP ▲

DEMO

DEMO

Space Force Application
Ballistic Missile Defense
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBM)
Legend:
OP = mature operational capability
DEMO = demonstrated/developmental capability
▲ = actively improving capability
▬ = no known capability

Table 3. Overview of Space Capabilities for Russia,
China, Iran, and North Korea
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While many countries may be able to exercise some
forms of A2/AD measures against U.S. space systems,
the remainder of this monograph will focus on Russia
and China as the most capable adversaries. Let us
examine the current and projected capabilities areas
with some examples of specific systems in the Russian
and Chinese space forces.
Near Peer Space A2/AD Capabilities
Russia
A 2013 Marshall Institute report provided some
historical background on Russian military space operations, noting, “The Soviet Union viewed outer space
as a theater where a war would be fought sooner or
later; consequently, it made preparations to fight a
war in space.”18 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) developed sophisticated apparatus such as
co-orbital and direct assent ASAT systems and a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, and ICBMs that
would travel to the United States over the South Pole.
Soviet space systems were largely considered to be of
poorer quality than those of the United States, although
there were significant exceptions in areas such as rocket
engine design.19 Regardless, the remains of the Soviet
space capabilities formed the backbone of the Russian
space force, although substantial space infrastructure
had to be integrated through agreements with former
Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2017 report
Russia Military Power states that Russia has over 130
civilian and military satellites performing a variety of
terrestrial support functions. The report characterizes
this space fleet as “both formidable and in a state of
11

rebuilding” and noted there are efforts underway to
“prioritize the modernization of its existing communications, navigation, and earth observation systems,
while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelligence
and early warning system constellations.”20 Let us
examine some details of this force in each of the five
space mission areas.
Space Situational Awareness: In this mission
area, Russia is largely dependent on its competent
ground-based early warning systems due to delays
in the modernization of its space-based detection and
tracking systems. A recent report from King’s College
London was blunt about this current shortfall: “the
space component of [an] early warning system has
effectively ceased to exist,”21 referring to the decline
of the Soviet-era Oko satellite warning system. Successful launches in November 2015 and May 2017 of
the next-generation missile warning system—the Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema (EKS, translated as Unified Space System)—completes only a quarter of the
system’s eight-satellite constellation. Also known as
Tundra, this modernization will improve the warning time since “a key improvement of the EKS system
over Oko is that EKS satellites do not just detect missile
launches, but can also track the path of the missile’s
flight.”22 Data from the space surveillance systems are
fused and utilized by the Main Missile Attack Center
for ballistic missile launches and by the Main Space
Situation Reconnaissance Center for orbital tracking
and deconfliction.23
Space Force Enhancement: The current DIA
assessment of Russian space resources indicates it
offers many capabilities to its warfighters, “including
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high-resolution imagery, terrestrial and space weather,
communications, navigation, missile warning, electronic intelligence, and scientific observations.”24 Consistent with their military doctrine, Russian forces
emphasize the need for extensive SATCOM, which
have been provided by at least six types of constellations
over several decades.25 The GLONASS (Globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema, translated as Global
Navigation Satellite System)—the Russian equivalent
of GPS—reached its fully operational constellation of
24 satellites in 2011, and is being maintained regularly
with new versions. The latest GLONASS put in service
was a third-generation satellite launched in June 2016.
The system currently has two on-orbit spares as well.26
Space Support: Russia has very mature space
launch vehicle (SLV) systems and subsystems, as well
as newer systems, some of which are based on retired
ICBMs. The venerable Soyuz and Proton rockets have
experienced a series of failures attributed to manufacturing and quality control issues over the past decade.
These problems were serious enough to cause a gap
in military launches over 11 months.27 Current Russian
space policy calls for a robust national space industry and infrastructure to meet national interests that
include “the creation of a new generation of space
complexes and systems to enable them to be competitive in the world market.”28 Progress toward this
space infrastructure revitalization has been uneven.
One notable achievement was the first launch from
the new Vostochny Cosmodrome in April 2016, a complex designed to reduce dependence on the Baikonur
Cosmodrome located in Kazakhstan. President Putin
attended the launch and stated afterwards, “Despite
all its failings, Russia remains the world leader in the
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number of space launches.”29 In addition to these bases,
Russia has four proven launch facilities within its borders at Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, Svobodny, and Yasny.30
Space Control: The Russian Federation inherited
many space denial capabilities from the dissolved
Soviet Union that included proven direct-ascent and
co-orbital ASATs as well as developmental laser and
directed energy systems.31 Their co-orbital ASAT had,
at a minimum, annual live tests from 1976 to 1982,
and it remained operational until 1993.32 The 2017
DIA Russia Military Power report indicates that many
of these resources remain: “[Russian] Military capabilities for space deterrence include strikes against
satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting
space operations.”33 Russia’s electronic warfare (EW)
systems include the Zhitel satellite navigation jammer
as well as the Borisoglebsk-2 complex designed to jam
SATCOM and radio navigation systems.34 Russian EW
systems with potential directed energy weapon abilities include the Krashukha-4, which has successfully
countered U.S. radar reconnaissance satellites and
claims to be able to disable electronics on low-orbiting
satellites.35 Russian space forces are actively testing a
new ASAT system based on the PL-19 Nudol missile36
with recent press reports of a fifth successful test in
December 2016.37
Space Force Application: The Soviet Union
invested heavily in land-based ICBMs as the strongest
part of their nuclear forces that also included bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
Russia continues this tradition, and it has modernization programs underway, although implementation
of these updates has suffered many delays. Its current
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force consists of Stiletto, Topol, Topol-M, Voevoda,
and Yars strategic missiles, as well as the developmental Sarmat.38 Unlike the silo-based U.S. land-based missile force, Russia deploys its ICBMs using both silo and
land-mobile basing, which may include rail-mobile
systems in the future.39 Russia is also completing its
new fleet of Borey-class ballistic missile submarines as
well as the new Bulava SLBM.40 With regard to ballistic
missile defense, Russia has fielded several versions of
the S-300, S-400, and S-500 anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems, and it continues to maintain a formidable
defense ring around Moscow. Additionally, these
ABM forces are being augmented by modified fighter
jets “used not only to gain air superiority but also to
confront enemy attack means in near-Earth space.”41
Finally, Russia is developing hypersonic weapons
with intercontinental range that could carry nuclear
or conventional warheads, which may challenge the
capabilities of the U.S. missile defense system.42
China
The current Army operating concept, Win in a
Complex World, contends, “China works to negate U.S.
advantages in space” in part through the development
of advanced ASAT capabilities.43 This viewpoint is reiterated in the 2017 Department of Defense (DoD) report
to Congress on China, which notes that China continues to invest in “space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology,” as well
as “a variety of counter-space capabilities designed
to degrade and deny the use of space-based assets by
adversaries.”44 Indeed, since 2000, the Chinese orbital
fleet has swelled from 10 satellites to over 200.45 Let us
examine some recent details of how China is working
to improve in each of the five space mission areas.
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Space Situational Awareness: The DoD assesses
that China has a functional space surveillance capability, but it seeks “to utilize space systems to establish
a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance
and warning system.”46 In his 2016 Congressional
testimony, space expert Dean Cheng provided additional insight into the Chinese efforts to build a more
robust space situational awareness, noting that such
improved capability is essential for the success of
their ASAT systems. Also, improved space situational
awareness will facilitate their space defense measures
by allowing them to detect and characterize adversary
orbital ASATs earlier, thus allowing them more time to
plan and execute evasive maneuvers.47
Space Force Enhancement: China continues to
make progress in the critical areas of space-based imagery, PNT support, and communications. In August
2014, China launched the Gaofen-2, its first imagery
satellite with a sub-meter resolution capability that
is used for government applications and commercial
sales.48 The Chinese satellite navigation system continues to grow, with four Beidou I1-S satellites added
in March 2015, two in medium Earth orbit like GPS
satellites and two in inclined geosynchronous (GEO)
orbit. These launches demonstrated the plan to extend
the Beidou network beyond regional coverage.49 Current plans are to have global coverage with a constellation of 35 total satellites by 2020.50 In August 2016,
China significantly enhanced its capability for secure
SATCOM by launching the first experimental communications that use quantum encryption technology.51
Space Support: Over the past 2 decades, China
has built an impressive infrastructure of spacecraft
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manufacturing, space launch, and satellite telemetry,
tracking, and command facilities. The robust family of
Long March SLVs was further expanded in 2016 with
the debut launches of the LM-5 medium lift SLV and
LM-5 heavy lift SLV, both of which can support their
growing human spaceflight program.52 These launches
were the first to occur from the new Wencheng space
launch center completed on Hainan Island in 2015.53
The Chinese are developing operationally responsive
space launch capabilities designed “to augment current constellations in time of crisis and to replace lost
assets in time of conflict.”54 Thus far, they have successfully developed the Kuaizhou-1A solid rocket SLV
to serve this purpose; its first launch of three small satellites occurred in January 2017.55
Space Control: China persists in acquiring technologies for its counter-space systems that provide hardkill and soft-kill options, to include directed-energy
weapons, jammers, and ASAT missiles. In addition,
they are suspected of testing dual-use capabilities, such
as autonomous maneuvering, in their satellite designs
that would allow them to perform counterspace tasks
on orbit.56 In what may have been a demonstration of
co-orbital ASAT capability, in 2010, two small Chinese satellites performed a series of maneuvers that
included a controlled conjunction. Since their infamous
2007 ASAT missile test, the PLA conducted additional
missile tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014 that have ASAT
applications.57 The missile in the 2013 test had a peak
altitude over 30,000 kilometers bringing it near the
vulnerable GEO belt, which is at an altitude of about
36,000 kilometers. Although pressed for explanation
by the United States and several international organizations, the Chinese Government has not given details
of the test’s purpose.58
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Space Force Application: Although it professes a
“No First Use” nuclear doctrine, China is aggressively
pursuing nuclear platforms with multiple warheads
and hypersonic delivery vehicles.59 The current Chinese nuclear inventory consists of 75-100 ICBMs and
4 of the Jin-class ballistic submarines, each carrying up
to 12 SLBMs. The PLA is developing subsystems such
as decoys, chaff, jamming, and shielding to enhance
the survivability of these weapons.60
China has developed at least one hypersonic boostglide vehicle through a series of seven prototype flight
tests since 2014. One of these tests included evasion
maneuvers at speeds over Mach 10 intended to defeat
U.S. missile defenses. The vehicle may be deployed
in the mid-2020s with either conventional or nuclear
warheads.61
China continues to develop a ballistic missile
defense that includes kinetic energy intercept capability at atmospheric and exoatmospheric altitudes.62 The
system includes two new indigenous radar designs,
one of which may be able to track multiple ballistic
missiles. The viability of the system was demonstrated
by successful midcourse intercept tests in 2010 and
2013.63
SPACE A2/AD IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY AND
JOINT OPERATIONS
What are the implications of space-related A2/AD
activities for the United States, its adversaries, and
other international entities? This section explores this
question at both the operational military level as well
as the strategic level that may include effects on other
elements of national power.
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Adversary View of Space Power
Strategic Level
Both Russia and China see space as a key part of
their national security and their international prestige, as well as their economic, political, and informational power. They also see the opportunity that their
space industries provide to access and influence other
countries. For example, such efforts by China include
satellite and space support infrastructure development for several Latin American countries, including
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.64
Russia provides the United States with access to the
International Space Station and it supports several
commercial spacelift ventures, including the company
Sea Launch, which has its homeport facilities in Long
Beach, California.65
For over 2 decades, the primary space launch program for the DoD, the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV), has included a critical dependence
on Russian RD-180 engines for the Atlas V rocket.66
Selected on the basis of technological superiority, the
agreement to purchase the engines from Russia was
also influenced by the desire of the United States to help
with Russia’s transition from the former Soviet Union.
This arrangement held until Russia’s 2014 annexation
of Crimea and the U.S. response of economic sanctions.
Russian threats to retaliate include the possible refusal
to sell any more RD-180 engines.67 There is no immediate replacement for the RD-180 and the cost estimates
for replacement with a U.S. design are over $1 billion
with a time lag of at least 5 years for the development
of a new design.68
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Despite the efforts to expand their arsenals of space
weapons, Russia and China are leading the effort for
global acceptance of the Treaty on the Prevention of
the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space—first introduced in 2008 and updated in 2014. The crux of the
treaty is found in its Article II, which states in part,
“States Parties to this Treaty shall not place any weapons in outer space; [and] not resort to the threat or use
of force against outer space objects of States Parties.”69
The official U.S. position is that:
the 2014 draft . . . [Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
of Force Against Outer Space Objects] is fundamentally
flawed. The scope of the proposal, absence of working
definitions, lack of verification mechanisms and failure to
address terrestrial-based ASAT weapons were all issues
for the United States.70

Operational Level
Like the United States, Russia and China seek to
make space capabilities an integral part of their unified military operations. Further, both countries promulgate that growing their military capabilities into
a strong, technologically advanced, and operationally
unified defense force is necessary to meet the growing
threats of the United States and its allies.
Russia views U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) space power as a viable threat, which
is reflected in their 2015 National Security Strategy and
2014 Military Doctrine.71 Specifically, these documents
express concern regarding:
U.S. missile defense systems stationed abroad,
Global Strike capabilities, and ‘strategic non-nuclear
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high-precision weapons,’ as well as the militarization of
space, all themes that came up in the military doctrine.72

To help address these security challenges, the 2017 DIA
report, Russia Military Power, asserts that Russia sees
counter-space operations as a way to control deterrence and escalation, especially with space-enabled
adversaries such as the United States.73
In August 2015, Russia created the Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily (VKS, translated as Russian Federation
Aerospace Forces) as an organization that mirrors
aspects of the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD).74 In a statement announcing
the reorganization, Russian Defense Minister Shoygu
noted that it was “prompted by a shift in the center of
gravity in combat struggle to the aerospace sphere.”75
Further, Russian leadership noted that formation of
the VKS was motivated by the increased speed of operations and decreased warning times in aerospace, as
well as the increased aerospace weapons development
by the United States.76 Accordingly, the VKS structure
includes space forces tasked with “conducting space
launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early
warning system, the satellite control network, and the
space object surveillance and identification network.”77
Chinese military leaders view “the control of outer
space as a natural extension of a nation’s control of
its territory.”78 Their careful observation of modern
wars in southwest Asia cause many of these leaders
to assess that “joint operations and command were so
effective because of U.S. space assets.”79 The 2017 DoD
report to Congress on Chinese security notes the “PLA
strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems—and to deny them to adversaries—as central to
enabling modern informatized warfare.”80 To exploit

21

the potential advantages of space capabilities, the current PLA guiding thought (roughly equivalent to U.S.
doctrine) emphasizes space operations in the active
defense and unified operations of the military:
Space operations must also be integrated into larger, joint
campaign plans to help achieve terrestrial objectives;
command and control [C2] of space operations must
therefore reconcile space-related requirements, timing,
and structure with those of the overarching joint
campaign.81

In late 2015, China established the Strategic Support Force to combine China’s military, space, cyber,
and EW missions. President Xi described the force as a
“new-type combat force to maintain national security
and an important growth point for the PLA’s combat
capabilities.”82 To unify their military forces further, in
February 2016, the PLA established five theater commands (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and
Central) followed in April 2016 by the formation of
their Joint Operations Command Center.83
Operational Space Links for U.S. Forces
Joint Operations
Space forces play a prominent role in current U.S.
joint operational concepts. The Capstone Concept for
Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO) views the
space domain’s importance to globally integrated military operations in a manner similar to that of Russia
and China:
Space and cyberspace will play а particularly important
role in the years ahead. As these domains figure more
prominently in the projection of military power,
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operations in them will become both а precursor to and
integral part of armed combat in the land, maritime and
air domains.84

The CCJO also notes the “dramatic increases in the
ability for adversaries to disrupt, degrade or destroy
cyberspace and space systems” and thus the need to
design U.S. systems that can operate in such degraded
environments.85 Further, the CCJO includes two explicit space-related force development initiatives: “continue to improve defensive space capabilities” and “integrate missile defense systems.”86 Finally, the CCJO
acknowledges the realities of defense acquisition and
admits, “such technologies, especially in а time of restricted budgets, may prove prohibitively expensive to
develop and deploy.”87
The 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC)
was written to provide a vision for the joint force to
address the challenges posed by emerging adversary
A2/AD capabilities. The JOAC bases this guidance
on three major trends: growth of A2/AD capabilities,
change in U.S. overseas basing, and conflict in space
and cyberspace. It also envisions a significant increase
in the role of space and cyberspace forces in traditional
air-sea-land operations.88 To counter this operational
synergy, the JOAC anticipates that “enemies may try
to disrupt U.S. use of space and cyberspace—commercial as well as governmental—well before the onset of
lethal combat.”89 Accordingly, 1 of the 11 operational
access precepts that enable the JOAC’s primary goal is
to “protect space and cyber assets while attacking the
enemy’s cyber and space capabilities.”90
The 2014 Joint Concept for Entry Operations “establishes a common intellectual framework for the challenge of entry in advanced A2/AD environments.”91
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It emphasizes the integration of forces across domains
and notes “regardless of the type of maneuver, mobility and flexibility are critical and enhanced when fully
integrated with cyberspace and space capabilities.”92
Consistent with current joint doctrine, the responsibility to incorporate space forces into a joint force—the
space coordinating authority—may fall upon the joint
force land component commander, if so designated.93
Army Operations and Multi-Domain Battle
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) publishes the 525-series of pamphlets to
describe “how future Army forces will prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars
while operating as part of our Joint Force and working
with multiple partners.”94 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-31, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World, 2020-2040, echoes the themes of joint operational access and discusses A2/AD challenges, which
include those related to space systems. This document
explicitly states that Landpower planners and leaders
should expect potential enemies to utilize “space capabilities such as anti-satellite [ASAT] weapons to disrupt U.S. communications and freedom of maneuver,”
and offers the example that adversary GPS jamming
could degrade the accuracy of precision fires.95 Win in a
Complex World also notes the active role of Army forces
in protecting U.S. space systems “through reconnaissance, offensive operations or raids to destroy landbased enemy space and cyberspace capabilities.”96
TRADOC pamphlets that complement Win in a
Complex World include documents that describe future
Army warfighting function concepts and amplify
the relevant space-based support needed for future
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mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and maneuver support.97
These concepts explicitly state that space warfighters
facilitate multi-domain battle and that such support
will likely involve:
Maneuver forces leverage space-based capabilities
through organic and embedded space professionals and
cadre within the formation. Space support elements,
Army space support teams and other specialized teams
combine to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate
the human and technical elements of space operations to
support maneuver forces across joint, interorganizational,
and multinational partners.98

The most recent TRADOC Concept Capability Plan
for space operations precedes the CCJO by 6 years, but
it contains the key themes of an increased integration
of space capabilities into Army operations, in parallel
with increased counter-space capabilities by adversaries. One of its explicit imperatives calls for the Army
to “systematically and deliberately evolve Army space
support operations over time to provide dedicated,
responsive theater focused support to operational and
tactical commanders.”99 A significant feature of such
theater support is the incorporation of the systems that
operate in a high altitude environment to augment
orbital assets, noting that “a high altitude long-loiter
system can provide long duration coverage of up to an
850-mile diameter field of view.”100
Presently, the Army, working with the Marine
Corps, is focused on the development of the Multi-Domain Battle concept of combined arms, which addresses
the A2/AD challenges identified in joint concepts and
includes a greater emphasis on space and other contested domains.101 The concept envisions future adversaries, such as Russia and China, that emphasize the
use of long-range precision strike capabilities protected
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by integrated air defense networks that would force
the joint forces to operate from dispersed locations.
The Multi-Domain Battle concept has three major components: “creating and exploiting temporary windows
of advantage; restoring capability balance and building flexible, resilient formations in the Joint Force; and
altering force posture to enhance deterrence.”102 To
aid in the concept development as well as its eventual
mission command, TRADOC offers a draft battlefield
framework that expands the three physical spaces of
AirLand Battle (rear, close, and deep) to six physical
spaces (strategic support, operational support, support, close, deep, and deep fires areas).103 In the current
framework version, space capabilities have a presence
in all of these physical spaces:
It is important that even virtual locations are tied
to physical locations within this framework. Space,
cyberspace, and information are often cited as exclusive
virtual domains or dimensions, but that attribution is
inaccurate. Achieving a physical effect requires a physical
location of a delivery mechanism, supporting points to
facilitate delivery, and the point of the intended effect.104

Given the importance of this crucial dependence on
space forces, what ongoing world activities might affect the future application of U.S. space power?
International Efforts
While space-based operations may occur in a near
vacuum environment, their effects and implications,
intentional or not, are rarely isolated to this domain.
Thus, with the United States, Russia, and China all
pursuing highly integrated military operations across
multiple domains, the possibility of unintentional
escalation is a prudent consideration. Vincent Manzo
of the National Defense University argues for the
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development of a common framework for interpreting
cross-domain operations “that would give decisionmakers a better sense of which actions and responses
are expected and accepted in real-world scenarios and
which would cross thresholds that escalate the situation.”105 He presents a vignette where China interferes
with a U.S. satellite during a military crisis, but does
not damage it. The U.S. response uses cyberspace
operations to interfere with the belligerent Chinese
system, but does not damage it. Is the U.S. response
proportional because it is in direct response to the initial aggression, or is it escalatory because it crosses
domains? The predicament is that different officials
in different governments may interpret such events in
dissimilar manners. Thus, the development of common
frameworks for space operations may decrease the
potential for unintended escalation of hostility that
could be sparked by counter-space activities.
The topic of weapons in space has garnered significant international attention, including from several
organizations within the United Nations (UN) such as
its Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
within the Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).
Building upon the foundation of the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967, these venues facilitate several noteworthy endeavors amongst nations to better define
the security environment of space, such as the No First
Place of Arms in Outer Space initiative and the 2013
UN Group of Government Experts on Transparency
and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs) in Outer
Space Activities.106 The report of the 2016 UNIDIR
Space Security Conference notes that “the United States
is committed to implementing norms of behavior from
the 2013 UN . . . [Group of Government Experts] on
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space TCBMs report” and that it encourages other
nations to do the same.107 A detailed analysis of these
ongoing efforts is worthy of its own monograph.108
The European Union (EU) continues to champion
the adoption of an International Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities, a proposal that has been met
with mixed reviews from other countries.109 In October 2016, the European Commission formally proposed a Space Strategy for Europe focused on four
strategic goals. The third goal, “Reinforcing Europe’s
Autonomy in Accessing and Using Space in a Secure
and Safe Environment,” clearly establishes the priority for EU Member States to maintain autonomous
access to space and related radio frequencies as well
as to protect European space infrastructure.110 Part of
the ways intended to achieve these ends is to leverage
the inherent synergies between military and defense
space systems, which include their Copernicus Earth
observation capabilities and the Galileo navigation
constellation.111
SPACE A2/AD MITIGATION MEASURES
The Joint Operating Environment 2035 (JOE 2035) predicts, “Competition in orbit (even during peacetime)
will be intense” involving a variety of counter-space
activities.112 What current Army and joint measures
may mitigate the negative effects of adversary A2/AD
activities and what space systems under development
may provide alternative capabilities for such mitigation? This section addresses this question by providing
examples of how the Army, joint forces, and coalition
members are working to address space-related A2/
AD concerns.
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Army Measures
During his June 2017 testimony before Congress,
Lieutenant General James Dickinson, Commanding
General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC)/Army Forces Strategic Command
(ARSTRAT) and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, addressed the
challenges facing U.S. ballistic missile defense and
noted the essential role that space-enabled capabilities provide. Progress in the emplacement of groundbased interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, as well as
the establishment of an inflight interceptor communications system data terminal at Fort Drum, New
York, have greatly increased the capability to defend
the United States against ICBM attacks from Iran and
North Korea.113
Earlier Congressional testimony by four Army generals representing the areas of operations and planning,
force management, capability development, and acquisition addressed the results of the Army’s first Strategic
Portfolio Analysis Review. Capability gaps identified
by the review included air and missile defense (AMD);
assured PNT; EW; and assured communications.114
Fortunately, the described ongoing Army programs
are addressing some of these shortfalls.
Resilient Space Systems
In its assessment of the technological needs for the
future joint force, JOE 2035 notes that systems other
than traditional large satellite constellations—such as
microsatellites or nanosatellites and near space platforms—may provide more responsive and resilient
space support.115 The USASMDC/ARSTRAT Technical
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Center recently completed an important milestone in
its Kestrel Eye technology demonstrator to provide
space-based imagery augmentation directly to theater warfighters at the brigade combat team level. On
August 14, 2017, the first Kestrel Eye was launched
on SpaceX Falcon 9 where it will be transferred to the
International Space Station for final orbital insertion.116
Once established in orbit, the microsatellite (about
50 kilograms) will go through a series of exercises by
U.S. Pacific Command to assess the system’s operational utility. If the demonstration is successful, then
the Army may opt to build a constellation of the satellites.117 If so, the aim for production versions of the
satellite is to cost less than $2 million each and have an
operational life of at least 1 year.118
The Army is also pursuing resilient SATCOM
through the Space and Missile Defense Command
Nanosatellite Program (SNaP) as an effort “to be a
cost-effective and responsive satellite technology
to mitigate the impact from the loss or disruption of
national space capabilities.”119 The concept is similar to
“a cellphone tower in space, except . . . for Army radios”
that provide voice and data SATCOM using nanosatellites (about 5.5 kilograms) that can hitch a ride to orbit
on larger space launches.120 Warfighters in U.S. Southern Command have helped to assess the operational
utility of some of the earlier SNaP demonstrations.121
Other areas of ongoing Army development include
high altitude and near space systems, navigation warfare, and high-energy lasers. High altitude systems
have the potential to augment and extend tactical communications as well as help provide PNT capabilities in
degraded environments.122 The USASMDC/ARSTRAT
Future Warfare Center is developing the concepts and
required capabilities to characterize the tactical PNT
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environment, assure friendly force use of PNT, and
deny adversary use of PNT.123 Various high-energy
laser demonstrators are being developed and tested
by USASMDC/ARSTRAT as part of a Maneuver and
Fire Integration Experiment (MFIX) series. Two mobile
lasers testbeds successfully contributed to MFIX 2016
at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and they demonstrated lethality against simulated threats. The lasers also serve as
platforms for warfighter familiarization and tactics,
techniques, and procedures development.124 The current lasers operate with up to 10 kilowatts of power;
the development goal is to increase the capability to 50
kilowatts by 2018 and 100 kilowatts by 2022.125
Training and Exercises for Theater Forces
To support the advancement of Multi-Domain
Battle concepts, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is creating
a multi-domain task force that “will integrate space
effects at the tactical level to support maneuver elements of the operational Army.”126 The task force is
planned to grow to a strength of 1,500 Soldiers and
its effectiveness can be enhanced through increased
awareness of space capabilities within the Army writ
large. Toward this end, the USASMDC/ARSTRAT
Future Warfare Center’s Directorate of Training and
Doctrine trained more than 8,750 Soldiers and civilians during fiscal year (FY) 2016 in over 30 different
courses that covered various aspects of the 5 space
mission areas. Many of the courses are open to members of other services.127 Also, the ARSTRAT G-3 Training and Exercise Division (TREX) is developing field
training events to demonstrate the effects of electromagnetic interference on GPS receivers—something
that Soldiers should expect to encounter in a contested
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space environment.128 To help instill space capability awareness at the beginning of an officer’s career,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT is partnering with West Point
for their Space and Missile Defense program that was
established in 2015, with a stand-alone major created
in 2017.129
Army forces help to spread the benefits of U.S.
space capabilities to other militaries around the world.
In May 2014, ARSTRAT TREX demonstrated space
kits to members of U.S. Army Africa that focused on
space-enabled force tracking and GPS jamming awareness;130 similar training was provided to Soldiers in
U.S. Army South earlier that year.131 In May 2016,
USASMDC/ARSTRAT teamed with the California
National Guard to provide space operations training
to Ukrainian soldiers in their country to help them deal
with degraded space support they experienced during
their conflict with Russian separatists.132 Additionally,
in June 2016, Army Space Support Teams supported
NATO exercise Anakonda-16 in Poland—a 10-day
event that involved more than 30,000 troops from 24
countries.133
Joint and Coalition Measures
In April 2016, the U.S. Air Force Space Command
announced its new Space Enterprise Vision to provide
an integrated approach that spans the five space mission areas and “enhances U.S. space forces’ ability to
deter others from interference and attack, defend our
space systems if deterrence fails and contribute to the
defense of allied space systems.”134 Let us examine
some specific examples in each space mission area of
ongoing efforts to increase the resilience of U.S. forces
in a contested space environment.
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Space Situational Awareness
During a January 2017 presentation at Stanford
University, USSTRATCOM Commander General John
Hyten discussed the formerly classified Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP),
calling the four-satellite constellation “basically a
neighborhood watch program for everything that goes
on in that high-value orbit.”135 The Air Force declared
the initial operational capability of GSSAP in September 2015.136 To provide a more holistic approach to
space situational awareness, USSTRATCOM established the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center (JICSpOC) in October 2015 at Schriever
Air Force Base, Colorado. JICSpOC’s mission was to
facilitate the fusion of space data amongst USSTRATCOM, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air
Force Space Command, the Air Force Research Laboratory, as well as to members of the intelligence community and commercial data providers.137 In April
2017, the JICSpOC was renamed the National Space
Defense Center to better match its mission as well as
to avoid it from being confused with the Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California.138
Several DoD programs seek to improve space
object detection and data processing for space force C2.
In February 2015, officials broke ground at Kwajalein
Atoll for construction of the Space Fence, an improved
replacement for the aged Air Force Space Surveillance
System. The system provides unprompted detection
data to the JSpOC for space objects as small as 10 centimeters.139 The Space Fence is on track for an initial
operating capability by 2019, and its future capability
may be expanded to a second site in Australia.140 Space

33

C2 is also being improved through the JSpOC Mission System modernization of hardware and software,
to handle the increased volume of space situational
awareness.141 The Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) is exploring future space situational
awareness capabilities such as OrbitOutlook, a program to provide automated synthesis of diverse sets
of orbital data that may “improve the capability of the
U.S. military and the global space community to make
decisions about potentially hazardous space objects in
near real time.”142
Space Force Enhancement
Modernization efforts continue for several constellations of satellites that provide crucial force
enhancement to warfighters in the areas of PNT, communication, missile warning, weather, and imagery.
In addition to the acquisition of the next-generation
GPS III satellites starting in 2017, the procurement of
the GPS Next Generation Operational Control System
ground control system will “provide enhanced cybersecurity, precision, reliability, and integrity.”143 In
addition, the Air Force is developing the Military GPS
User Equipment receiver for joint warfighters that will
improve PNT capabilities and resistance to emerging
counter-space measures such as jamming.144
Ongoing SATCOM improvements include the
upcoming launch of the fourth Advanced Extremely
High Frequency satellite system, part of a four-satellite
constellation that “provides survivable, anti-jam, low
probability of detection/intercept, worldwide secure
communications for tactical and strategic users,” as
well as nuclear effects-hardened SATCOM.145 The
Enhanced Polar System will serve as a polar-orbiting
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extremely high frequency SATCOM adjunct to the
advanced extremely high frequency system. Its second
of two satellites is planned for launch in late 2017 for
an operational capability achieved by mid-2018.146
With regard to Earth observation systems, the spacebased infrared system (SBIRS) remains the mainstay
for space-based launch detection and missile warning.
The third GEO SBIRS satellite was launched in January 2017 and the fourth GEO SBIRS is scheduled to
launch in early 2018 to complete the constellation that
also includes two smaller satellites in highly elliptical
orbit.147 The Weather System Follow-on-Microwave is
the DoD’s third attempt to replace the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. The weather system satellite
is in the early phases of development; its system-level
preliminary design review is scheduled for mid-2018.
Ongoing efforts by the DoD’s Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental initiative include contracts for improved
satellite imagery. The DoD has two contracts for the
analysis of data from synthetic aperture radar microsatellites to increase terrestrial situational awareness—
one with Capella Space for the satellite imagery and
one with Orbital Insight Space for analysis.
Space Support
The EELV has amassed an impressive 70 consecutive successful national security space launches as
of March 2017. The current fleet is comprised of the
Atlas V, Delta IV Heavy, and Falcon 9 SLVs that can
compete for three planned launches for 2018.148 The
Air Force is exploring reusable spacecraft technologies using the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle, the first
vehicle since NASA’s Space Shuttle to successfully fly
in space, land on a runway, and return to space in a
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subsequent launch. The X-37B has flown four times
since April 2010.149 DARPA is also working on the
most responsive space access capabilities such as the
Experimental Spaceplane program formerly known as
XS-1, “an entirely new class of hypersonic aircraft that
would bolster national security by providing short-notice, low-cost access to space.”150 A defunct DARPA
program, the Airborne Launch Assist Space Access,
aimed “to propel 100-pound satellites into low Earth
orbit . . . within 24 hours of call-up, all for less than $1
million per launch.” While the program did make it
to the design phase of a technology demonstrator and
some subscale tests, safety concerns over its highly
energetic monopropellant ended the program.
DARPA is partnering with industry to explore
possible on-orbit satellite maintenance systems such
as the Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites
(RSGS) designed to inspect, maintain, and repair GEO
satellites.151 The RSGS goal is to have a technology
demonstrator in orbit by 2022.152 While such a system
would provide incredible new capabilities for the U.S.
space fleet, the dual-use potential of RSGS may also be
viewed as a weapon by potential adversaries.
Space Control
The JOE 2035 calls for the possible use of offensive
space control as part of the defense of global commons
as well as the need for U.S. forces to be able to respond
to attempts by adversaries to create orbital debris
fields.153 In 2008, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency conducted Operation Burnt Frost at the direction of President Bush to destroy a non-functioning U.S. satellite
that posed a hazard to life during an uncontrolled reentry. Although not its intended purpose, the successful
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operation demonstrated the low-orbit ASAT capability
of the U.S. Aegis cruiser/Standard Missile-3 system.154
Defense counter-space forces include two Air Force
squadrons of Space Aggressors tasked “to prepare joint
forces and coalition partners to fight in and through
contested space environments by analyzing, teaching and replicating realistic, relevant and integrated
space threats.”155 Currently, the 26th and 527th Space
Aggressor Squadrons focus on replicating live electronic attacks on GPS and SATCOM systems to help
warfighters hone their tactics, techniques, and procedures. During the 2016 exercise Red Flag-Alaska 16-3,
a Soldier from the 1st Space Battalion was integrated
into the aggressor squadrons for the first time.156
Space Force Application
From a monetary resource viewpoint, the United
States is very serious about maintaining an able space
force. Ballistic missile defense systems for services
are funded for $6.5 billion in the DoD FY 2018 budget
request for an investment for interceptors and surveillance radars. The budget includes an additional $7.9
billion for the Missile Defense Agency and $3.7 billion
for two Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers in missile
defense configuration.157
Members of U.S. missile defense forces continue to
partner with allies in the biannual Nimble Titan missile defense experimentation campaigns sponsored
by USSTRATCOM and led by the Joint Functional
Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense,
which is the “third hat” for USASMDC/ARSTRAT.
The Nimble Titan events not only bring warfighters
from different nations together, but also players who
focus on policy-level lessons for their organizations.158
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In March 2017, the Nimble Titan 18 campaign commenced with an event in the Netherlands attended
by participants from 26 nations. The campaign will
address missile defense interoperability and integration as well as strategic issues such as deterrence and
de-escalation measures.159
Like Russia and China, the United States is investing heavily in the modernization of its land- and seabased strategic ballistic missiles. The FY 2018 budget
request includes $1.27 billion for the ongoing Trident
II SLBM life extension that will keep the missiles as a
viable deterrent through 2042, as well as $1.89 billion
for work on the Columbia-class fleet ballistic missile
submarine, which is set to begin replacing Ohio-class
submarines in 2028.160 The Ground-Based Strategic
Deterrent program aims to provide a modern replacement for the venerable Minuteman III ICBM fleet. Still
in its earlier stages, the program will incorporate technologies necessary to address the projected threats
through 2075. It is currently funded for $215 million in
FY 2018, with deployment planned for the late 2020s.161
NATO Space Capabilities
NATO doctrine for space operations is included
as chapter 5 of Allied Joint Publication-3.3, Allied Joint
Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. It focuses on three
of the Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, mission areas: space situational awareness, space force
enhancement, and space control, which includes defensive space control operations to protect friendly space
systems and recover from adversary disruptions and
attacks. Allied Joint Publication-3.3 also identifies the
roles of space in the planning and execution of NATO
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operations as well as how to accomplish space support
coordination at the strategic and operational levels.162
While NATO has conducted space operations since
1970, it relies on its member nations to provide military
space capabilities. In a 2014 Marshall Center paper,
Colonel Paul Tombarge argues for the establishment
of a NATO Center of Excellence for space operations.
To support his case, he presents a detailed compilation of existing NATO member space assets and the
existing space-related positions in NATO’s command
structure as well as recommended changes to improve
the integration of these space capabilities.163
The recent Trident Junction 2016 included the “first
integration of Space in a major NATO exercise as it
involved incorporation, synchronization, integration
and exploitation of Space-based products and services
into Joint Task Force . . . operations.”164 Participants
included space experts from USASMDC/ARSTRAT,
as well as ones from France, Canada, Germany, and
Italy. The current plan is to build on this success by
establishing such space operations participation in
future Trident Junction exercises.165
RECOMMENDATIONS
With the most capable space systems in the world,
U.S. space forces are alluring targets for adversaries
who wish to diminish the effectiveness of joint forces
that depend upon space capabilities. Based on the
material discussed in this monograph, the following
recommendations identify opportunities for improvement at the operational and strategic levels to build a
more coherent and effective military space force that
supports all elements of national power.
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Operational Opportunities
Awareness and Realistic Expectations for Space Support
Space operations typically receive short shrift in
the core curriculum of intermediate and senior service
schools, often crammed into a single lesson that covers
the entirety of USSTRATCOM missions. This relegation of priority may propagate ignorance of the wealth
of opportunities available from space forces, and thus
hamper the full integration of space operations into
new paradigms, such as Multi-Domain Battle.
In contrast, the DoD and the U.S. Army should
be cautious not to over-promise and under-deliver
on space capabilities. Publicly accessible USASMDC
videos, such as “Army Space Power 2035,” border on
fantasy in their depiction of Army space capabilities
that might be available in less than 2 decades. The video
“SMDC2017” is a more realistic depiction of Army
space operation, albeit somewhat overdramatic.166
Aerospace as the Center of Gravity
The creation of the VKS (Aerospace Force) is a huge
change for the Russian military, driven in part by the
perceived “shift in center of gravity in combat struggle to the aerosphere,” as noted by Defense Minister
Shoyu.167 Current Army activities often focus disproportionately on Landpower first and add in generic
(vice integrated) inputs from aerospace sources.
Instead, Army training, education, and planning
should actively consider and possibly embrace the
Russian view of aerospace as the center of gravity of
the future, with land and sea forces as rapid maneuver
elements. Such a shift in perspective can help to inform
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how the Army should evolve to remain the world’s
preeminent Landpower force.
“Space-Cyberspace-Electromagnetic Spectrum” Confusion
Military operations that involve space, cyberspace,
or the electromagnetic spectrum are probably the least
understood by those who plan and execute them.
The DoD and the joint staff should actively promulgate the development of coherent military theory for
these areas as a foundation for doctrine and concept
development.168 In an August 2017 article, then-TRADOC commander General David Perkins noted that,
“integrating space and cyberspace domains and the
electromagnetic spectrum for how Army units and
joint forces will fight is something the Department of
Defense [DoD] is just now beginning to understand.”169
As such, many Army and joint guidance documents
simply lump these three spheres of operation together.
This current muddled approach to doctrine and concepts works against the achievement of unified action
and it will become more of an issue now that U.S.
Cyber Command will become a unified command separate from and equal to USSTRATCOM.170
Cyberspace Consideration in Space System Designs
The DoD should fully explore the role of cyberspace
forces in protecting the link segments to space-based
assets since it is possible for malware to be inserted
in uplinks and distributed via downlinks. Moreover, builders of satellites and space support facilities
should implement cybersecurity features as integral
design elements. Such features should emphasize mission resilience of the overall space system vice mere
protection of individual system assets.171
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Consideration of Natural Space Hazards
Outer space is an inherently hostile environment
driven by solar weather with volatile effects that can
disrupt space links and damage spacecraft. Significant solar weather events can also degrade the effectiveness of space surveillance, warning sensors, and
terrestrial communications. Although not discussed
in this monograph, planning and execution of space
operations need to consider the naturally hostile space
environment itself fully, especially when assessing
and attributing damage to on-orbit assets during crises
or conflict.
Strategic Opportunities
Unintentional Escalation Potential
The DoD should thoroughly and proactively assess
the escalation potential associated with the means and
effects of space-related A2/AD activities in increasing
levels of crisis and conflict. This assessment should
avoid egocentrism in assigning value to various elements of a space force, but must clearly articulate the
threshold bounds for attacks on certain crucial U.S.
space systems (such as ICBM early warning and nuclear
C2). These thresholds should be communicated by
means of diplomatic and informational national power
using venues such as the bilateral agreements and UN
fora.
Hypersonic Weapons
In her assessment of the status of hypersonic
weapon development around the world, Department
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of Energy technical analyst Rachel Wiener noted, “The
totality of Russian and Chinese advancements has a
potentially destabilizing effect for U.S. nuclear deterrence posture and presents complex strategic choices
for U.S. policymakers.”172 The DoD should continue to
ensure that development of future U.S. missile defense
addresses the unique operational profiles presented
by such weapon platforms. In addition, as the U.S.
deterrent force is revitalized, USSTRATCOM and the
DoD should continue to assess the role of hypersonic
systems in deterrence—which may include delivery of nuclear warheads—and provide the necessary
resources for success.
Whole-of-Government Approach
The DoD space organizations should continue to
develop and maintain vehicles like the National Space
Defense Center to facilitate unity of national space
power but also to create synergy for approaching new
challenges. A recent opportunity for such activities is
found in the revival of the National Space Council on
June 30, 2017, which marks the return of this venue
since it ceased operation in 1993. Upon signing the
Executive Order, President Trump declared, “The
National Space Council will be a central hub guiding
space policy within the Administration.”173
Partnering with Industry
The DoD should continue to partner with U.S.
aerospace industry and other private sector technology organizations to pursue innovative and cost-effective approaches to future space operations. In addition
to the ongoing Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
initiative, both USASMDC and the Air Force Space
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and Missile Systems Center released Broad Agency
Announcements to the public this year to solicit
new technologies and concepts for the DoD space
enterprise.174
Stewardship of Technology
The DoD as well as the Departments of State and
Commerce should continue their vigilance with regard
to the export of technology, especially space-related
technologies that can be dual tasked (for example, an
autonomous maintenance satellite that could be used
as an ASAT). The DoD should examine the RD-180
Russian engine situation for lessons learned regarding
the dependence on imported technology for critical
aspects of U.S. space systems. Finally, when deliberating the proper balance of investment across diverse
technologies, the DoD should consider the advice
offered in JOE 2035 that “the fascination with small
and cheap must be balanced against an appreciation
for capital-intensive weapons and industrial technologies with the potential to dramatically alter the strategic landscape.”175
Role of Humans in Space-Based Operations
Russia and China, as well as much of the world,
consider their active capability for human space flight
to be a matter of great national prestige. In contrast, the
United States willingly abdicated its ability to launch
astronauts. Since 2011, NASA has been paying the Russian Government to provide the United States access to
the International Space Station, a spacecraft in which
the United States has invested over $50 billion. It may
be a prudent measure for the DoD and NASA to carefully examine how human space flight contributes to
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all elements of U.S. national power and to develop a
long-range strategy based on the path that would best
benefit the United States writ large.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The vision of outer space as a vast and tranquil sea
is but an illusion; space is an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and
competitive among the nations—and this trend shows
no sign of abatement. However, as with the land, sea,
and air commons, the peaceful pursuit of economic,
diplomatic, and informational ends in space often
requires the support of a capable and restrained military space force. The continued preeminence of U.S.
military space capabilities depends on the continued
efforts to ensure access to and freedom of movement
within the space domain.
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of interest reflect USASMDC/ARSTRAT emphasis for Fiscal
Years (FY) 2017 and 2018, specifically in the areas as follows:
Tactically Responsive Space; Space Superiority; Integrated
Air and Missile Defense [AMD]/Homeland Defense;
Directed Energy . . . ; High Altitude . . .; Cybersecurity;
Positioning, Navigation, Timing (PNT)/Navigational
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Warfare . . . ; Test, Lethality, and Survivability; and Global
Satellite Communications (SATCOM).

175. JOE 2035, pp. 17-20:
•

•

•

•

Proliferation of advanced radio-frequency weapons.
Advances in phased-array technology will facilitate
the development of beam-focusing systems, which will
permit high-powered radio frequency . . . weapons to
degrade or destroy very precisely versus omnidirectional
systems. This will lead to new applications for area
denial, crowd control, and the destruction of a range of
electronic equipment [emphasis and italics in original].
(p. 17)
Availability of non-nuclear . . . [electromagnetic pulse].
Non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse . . . weapons will
allow for the discriminate and precise targeting of a
range of electronics-based systems. The next two decades
will see these weapons integrated into air, ground, and
surface systems providing adversaries the capability
to disrupt, degrade, and disable components of U.S.
and allied . . . [Command, Control, Communications,
Computers/ISR] networks [emphasis and italics in
original]. (pp. 17-18)
Deployment of >100 KW electrical lasers. Electrical laser
systems will become smaller, lighter, and cheaper, and
the introduction of femto- and pico-second pulses will
lead to novel sensors and effects. Ultra-precise, multiple
shot, weaponized lasers will easily achieve >100 KW,
permitting stealthy engagements at longer ranges with
less dwell time required to achieve effects [emphasis
and italics in original]. (p. 19)
Hypersonics. It is probable that one or more states
will field an operational hypersonic weapon system
within the next two decades. Likely to achieve speeds
in excess of one mile per second on non-ballistic flight
paths, functional hypersonic systems will improve the
range, accuracy, and lethality of offensive global strike
capabilities and have the potential to disrupt portions
of anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] capabilities as well
as missile defense systems [emphasis and italics in
original]. (p. 19)
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A2/AD
ABM
AMD
ARSTRAT
ASAT
C2
CCJO
DARPA
DIA
DoD
EELV
EKS
EU
EW
FY
GEO
GLONASS
GNSS
GPS
GSSAP
HGV

anti-access/area denial
anti-ballistic missile
air and missile defense
Army Forces Strategic Command
anti-satellite
command and control
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle
Edinaya Kosmicheskaya Sistema
(translated as Unified Space
System)
European Union
electronic warfare
fiscal year
geosynchronous
Globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya sistema (translated as Global
Navigation Satellite System)
Global Navigation Satellite System
(worldwide)
global positioning system
Geosynchronous Space Situational
Awareness Program
hypersonic gliding vehicle
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ICBM
ISR
JICSpOC
JOAC
JOE 2035
JSpOC
NASA
NATO
NORAD
PLA
PNT
RSGS
SATCOM
SBIRS
SCA
SLBM
SLV
SMDC
SNaP
SSI
TRADOC
TREX
UN

intercontinental ballistic missile
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance
Joint Interagency Combined Space
Operations Center
Joint Operational Access Concept
Joint Operating Environment 2035
Joint Space Operations Center
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North American Aerospace Defense
Command
People’s Liberation Army
position, navigation, and timing
Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites
satellite communications
space-based infrared system
space coordinating authority
submarine-launched ballistic
missile
space launch vehicle
Space and Missile Defense
Command
Space and Missile Defense
Command Nanosatellite Program
Strategic Studies Institute
Training and Doctrine Command
Training and Exercise Division
United Nations
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UNIDIR
UNOOSA
USASMDC
USAWC
U.S.S.R.
USSTRATCOM
VKS

United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research
United Nations Office for Outer
Space Affairs
U.S. Army Space and Missile
Defense Command
U.S. Army War College
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S. Strategic Command
Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily
(translated as Russian Federation
Aerospace Forces)
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APPENDIX

Protection

Sustainment

Fires

Intelligence

Movement
and Maneuver

Joint Space Operations
Mission Areas

Mission
Command

Army Warfighting Functions

Space Situational Awareness
Detect/Track/Identify

X

Threat Warning & Assessment

X

X

Characterization

X

X

X

X

Data Integration & Exploitation

X

X

X

X

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance

X

X

X

X

X

Launch Detection

X

X

X

X

X

Missile Tracking

X

X

X

X

X

Environmental Monitoring

X

X

X

X

X

X

Satellite Communications

X

X

X

X

X

X

Positioning, Navigation, & Timing

X

X

X

X

X

X

Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Space Force Enhancement

Space Supports
Spacelift
Satellite Operations

X
X

X

X

X

Reconstitution of Space Forces

X

X

X

Space Control
Offensive Space Control

X

X

X

X

Defensive Space Control

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Space Force Application
Ballistic Missile Defense
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

X

Table Appendix-1. Joint Space Operations Support
of Army Operations1
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ENDNOTES – APPENDIX
1. Revised table originally printed in Jeffrey L. Caton, Evolving
Army Needs for Space-Based Support, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2015, p. 7.
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